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Abstract 
 
We confront microeconomic theory with macroeconomic data. Unemployment results 
from two main micro-level decisions of workers and firms. Most of the efficiency 
wage and bargaining theories predict that over the business cycle, unemployment falls 
below its natural rate when the worker’s real wage exceeds the reservation wage. 
However, these theories have weak empirical support. Firm’s decision predicts that 
when the worker’s real wage exceeds the marginal product of labor, unemployment 
increases above its natural rate. Accounting for this microeconomic decision helps 
explain almost all the fluctuations of U.S. unemployment. 
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1. Introduction  
 
The U.S. unemployment rate increased between December 2007 and June 2009 
because of the Great Recession, but began to fall, slowly since the early 2010. It 
dropped from 9.8 percent in March 2010 to 6.7 percent in March 2014. This is still 
higher than the average unemployment rate of 5.8 percent over the period 1948-2014. 
Labor market outcomes, especially the unemployment rate, are critical to U.S. 
monetary policymakers.  
 
The modern theories of unemployment include, for example, efficiency wage (e.g., 
Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1984) and the dynamic search and matching (e.g., Mortensen and 
Pissarides, 1994). The empirical support for efficiency wage and dynamic search and 
matching models is weak. Dynamic search and matching models of unemployment 
predict that the volatility of the employment – vacancy ratio and average labor 
productivity are the same while the U.S. data show that the standard deviation of the 
unemployment-vacancy ratio is 20 times larger than that of average labor productivity, 
Shimer (2005).  
 
Essentially, one cannot analyze unemployment dynamic without analyzing the 
relationship between wages, productivity, and unemployment. Efficiency wage and 
bargaining models have such relationship, which is called the wage curve, e.g., 
Blanchflower and Oswald (1994). Blanchard and Katz (1997) show that models of 
unemployment based on efficiency wages, matching or bargaining models, and 
competitive wage determination, all generate such a wage curve relationship. In the 
wage curve, the dependent variable is the natural log of real wage. The independent 
variables are the natural log of the reservation wage, the productivity level, and the 
rate of unemployment (could be a natural log-transformed measure of unemployment). 
Given the level of productivity, the relationship between the log of real wages relative 
to the reservation wage, and the unemployment rate, is negative. These theories 
interpret this correlation that when unemployment is high, the real wage falls – given 
productivity.  
 
However, there is a microeconomic interpretation. A worker faced with a decision to 
accept or reject a job with a particular wage offer would take the job if the real wage 
rate is greater than his or her reservation wage, given the level of productivity. Hence, 
2 
 
W. Razzak, 2014 
 
the unemployment rate to fall. The worker rejects the job offer if the real wage is less 
than his or her reservation wage, hence, unemployment increases. However, these 
models do not account for another important decision, i.e., the firm’s decision. In the 
Beveridge curve (BC) analysis of vacancy and unemployment, for example, there is 
no representation of the firm’s demand for labor, Daly et al. (2012). They suggested 
adding a “job creation curve” to the BC. The decision is that firms continue to hire 
workers over the business cycle as long as the real wage rate is less than the marginal 
product of labor; stops hiring when the real wage is equal to the marginal product of 
labor; and layoffs workers when the real wage is higher than the marginal product of 
labor. 
 
The objective of this paper is to examine the effects of these two micro-level 
decisions on unemployment. We explain unemployment dynamics by empirically 
testing the contributions of the two important micro-level decisions. We will show 
that the first decision could explain up to 50 percent of the dynamics of 
unemployment, and that the weak empirical support of unemployment theories is due 
to ignoring the firm’s decision. The firm’s decision and the worker’s decision together 
explain almost all the fluctuations of U.S. unemployment. 
 
We use U.S. quarterly data from 1999 to 2013.  The data and sources are in the adta 
appendix. There is one important point that the relationships we are analyzing are 
those that occur over the business cycle. We show that these two decisions can 
account for almost all the variations of the U.S. unemployment over the business 
cycle. The paper is organized as follows. Next, we explain the worker’s and the firm’s 
decisions that we call microeconomic level decisions, and how they are related to 
unemployment. In section 3 we provide measurements and tests. In section 4 we 
discuss the relationship with the Phillips curve and the wage curve. Section 5 
concludes. 
 
2. Microeconomic level decisions and measurements  
2.1 The worker’s decision  
 
 
Consider the worker’s decision to accept or reject a wage offer, which is the 
mechanism underlying the wage curve. A worker who faces a decision to accept or 
reject a wage offer compares the offered real wage to a reservation wage, which is the 
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wage equivalent of being unemployed. The reservation wage is an unobservable 
variable. If the real wage rate is greater than the reservation wage, the worker accepts 
the offer, takes the job, and unemployment falls. The opposite is true. Thus, the 
covariance between the wage gap, which is the real wage minus the reservation wage, 
and the unemployment rate, is negative. 
 
How much of the variation in unemployment over the business cycle is accounted for 
by this mechanism? To answer this question we have to measure the real wage and 
the reservation wage. The former is less complicated than the latter, but we do not 
have a unique way to measure them because expected inflation or expected price level 
are not directly observable. The best measure must be robust to a variety of measures 
of expectations.  
 
2.1.1 Measuring the real wage 
 
Let the real wage be ePWw / , where W is the nominal wage rate, and eP is the 
expected price level. We could also adjust the nominal wage to a measure of the 
expected inflation rate e . 
 
We can have a number of measures of eP and e depending on how many different 
measures of expected inflation we have. We will use the CPI as a measure of the price 
level. Let the expected price level be a 6-quarter moving average of the CPI. In 
addition we consider four different measures of expected inflation: (1) a 6-quarter 
moving average of the rate of change of the CPI; (2) the Philadelphia fed’s survey 
measure of inflation expectations; and (3) the Michigan University’s survey measure 
of inflation expectations. Then we can adjust the average hourly wage rate to these 
measures of expected price level and expected inflation. We arrive at four different 
measures of the real wage. Figure (1) plots the HP-filtered measures. The real 
wage, 1w , is the associated with average inflation measured as a 6-quarter moving 
average of CPI inflation; 2w is associated with Philadelphia fed’s survey measure of 
inflation expectations; 3w  is associated with the Michigan University’s survey 
measure of inflation expectations; and 4w is associated with the expected price level.   
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Clearly, these measures are robust to various price and inflation adjustments. 
However, note that what matters for us is the wage gap, the gap between the real wage 
and the reservation wage, which we will examine next. 
 
 
2.1.2 Measuring the reservation wage 
 
The reservation wage is the wage equivalent of being unemployed. Most of the 
theoretical model of wage setting could be represented by the following wage 
equation under simplifying assumptions about the functional form and indicators of 
labor market tightness: 
 
ttt
R
tt uyww   ln)1(lnln ,     (1) 
 
Where w is the real wage, Rw is the reservation wage, y is labor productivity, where 
labor productivity is GDP/working age population, and u is log )1/( UU  , where 
uppercase U is the unemployment rate.
i
 The parameter  is [0, 1]. For example, in the 
efficiency wage model of Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) – the shirking model – 
productivity does not influence wages directly, hence 1 . In the bargaining models, 
e.g., Mortensen and Pissarides (1994), 10   , since wages depend on the surplus 
from match, thus on productivity.  
 
Blanchard and Katz (1999) argue that the reservation wage depends on the generosity 
of benefits (unemployment benefits and other benefits), and other income supports the 
workers expect to have while they are unemployed. The institutional dependence of 
unemployment benefits on past wage level, may suggest that the reservation wage 
also depends on past wages. The reservation wage depends also, on what the 
unemployed do with their time – the utility of leisure, which may include home 
production and income that could be earned in the informal sector. The reservation 
wage may also depend on non-labor income. Under a Harrod-neural technological 
progress, an increase in productivity leads to an increases in both labor and non-labor 
income. Thus, the reservation wage may depend on both past wages and productivity 
levels. They argue that it is “empirically reasonable” to assume that technological 
progress does not lead to a persistent trend in unemployment, which puts an additional 
restriction that is the reservation wage is homogenous of degree one in the real wage 
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and productivity in the long run. This is a testable hypothesis, which we will examine 
later. Blanchard and Katz (1999) assume the following simple illustrative equation for 
the reservation wage: 
 
ttt
R
t ywaw    ln)1(lnln 1 ,         (2) 
 
where 10   . 
 
Thus, we have at least two options to measure the reservation wage. First, we can 
estimate the State-Space Kalman filter system of equation (1). We experimented with 
two different specifications, e.g., in levels, log levels, with unemployment, and with 
cyclical unemployment. We estimate the variances as additional parameters. The log 
version fits very well. 
 
The signal equation is: 
 
ttt
R
tt uyww  
~lnlnln 1 ;       (3) 
 
the state equation; 
 
t
R
t
R
t ww  1lnln ; and        (4) 
  
the variance of the shock t  
 
2
2   , 
 
which is estimated jointly.  
 
We estimate the system above using a Maximum Likelihood method. The 
unemployment variable u~  is the HP-filtered log unemployment as defined earlier, 
where the symbol  denotes the cyclical component. The other measure of the 
reservation wage is to calibrate equation (2) using a number of values for .ii 
 
Table (1) reports the correlation coefficients between some estimates of the, HP-
filtered, log reservation wage using both of the methods explained above, along with 
log real wage. We use a sensitivity analysis. The reservation wage data are denoted 
RR ww 101   in addition to the Kalman filter estimate. The first six estimates 
RR ww 61  are 
from calibrating equation (2), where we impose the homogeneity restriction on 
equation (2). The values for are given below.  
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Parameter values used to calibrate ttt
R
t ywaw    ln)1(lnln 1  - 
Homogeneity restriction imposed  
Rw1  ]50.0,65.2[  a  
Rw2  ]75.0,65.2[  a  
Rw3  ]85.0,65.2[  a  
Rw4  ]90.0,65.2[  a  
Rw5  ]95.0,65.2[  a  
Rw6  ]99.0,65.2[  a  
Parameter values used to calibrate tt
R
t ywaw lnlnln 211    - Homogeneity 
restriction not imposed so the weights on lagged wages and productivity do not sum 
up to one 
Rw7  ]15.0,90.0,65.2[ 21  a  
Rw8  ]10.0,95.0,65.2[ 21  a  
Rw9  ]25.0,95.0,65.2[ 21  a  
Rw10  ]10.0,99.0,65.2[ 21  a  
 
Finally, we have the reservation wage estimated using the Kalman filter and the real 
wage. Table (1) shows that these measures are highly correlated over the business 
cycle regardless of whether the homogeneity restriction is imposed, or not. However, 
a small value of  , e.g., 0.50, which means a larger weight on productivity, produces 
a reservation wage estimate that is less correlated with the other estimates. Essentially, 
the reservation wage is dependent more on lagged wages than on productivity. It 
suggests that the value of is not necessarily equal to one as in Shapiro and Stiglitz 
(1984) and to Blanchard and Katz (1999). Figure (2) plots all the estimates along with 
the real wage (HP-filtered).  
 
Given our estimates of the real wage and the reservation wage, we calculate the wage 
gap (the log real wage – log reservation wage), but we drop the extreme estimates, 
which correspond to the reservation wages with low value of  , i.e., 50.0  
and 75.0 . We have wage gaps corresponding to the estimated reservation wages, 
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and the Kalman filter. We plot the data in figure (3). The estimates are highly 
correlated.   
 
The theory predicts that the covariance between the wage gap and unemployment is 
negative because when the real wage is greater than the reservation wage the worker 
takes the job, hence unemployment falls. We test the covariance for each estimate of 
the wage gap and the unemployment rate. We test the correlations using a confidence 
ellipse, which is distributed 2 95.0,1 . Figure (4) plot the confidence ellipses. Some 
correlations are positive, which are inconsistent with the theory. These are found in 
plots 1, 2, 3, which correspond to wage gaps, where the reservation wage are 
calibrated using equation (2), and the weight  , is either low (0.50, 0.75 and 0.85) or 
the homogeneity restriction is not imposed and the weight on productivity is > 0.10. 
There are two cases, where the correlation is positive; these are plots 7 and 9, which 
correspond to Rw7 and
Rw9 , where 90.01   and 15.02  and 95.01  and 
25.02  for
Rw7  and 
Rw9 respectively. Generally, the test suggests that for the 
prediction of the theory to hold (i.e. the gap between the real wage and the reservation 
wage and unemployment are negatively correlated), the homogeneity restriction need 
not be imposed, but the weight on productivity in equation (2) should still be smaller 
than the weight on lagged waged. In other words, productivity affects the reservation 
wage and the real wage, but the effect is smaller than the effect of lagged wages.  
 
Table (2) reports a number of regressions using the wage gaps that are, statistically 
significantly, negatively correlated with unemployment in figure (4). The wage gap, 
depending on measurement, can explain up to 50 percent of unemployment’s 
fluctuations over the business cycle.  
 
3. The firm’s decision  
 
The firm’s decision to hire workers has not been empirically tested in macroeconomic 
models of unemployment. Over the business cycle, the firm hires workers as long as 
the marginal product of labor exceeds the real wage; it stops hiring additional workers 
when the marginal product of labor is equal to the real wage; and it lays-off workers 
when the marginal product is lower than the real wage. The marginal product of labor 
can deviate from the real wage over the business cycle, and for a number of reasons. 
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Thurow (1968) provides some insight. The wedge exists because: (1) Taxes can create 
a wedge if the incidence of the indirect taxes is on labor. (2) Monopoly power can 
explain differences between the marginal product of factor inputs and their prices. (3) 
Constant substitution between factor inputs along growth path could create a wedge 
between the real wage and the marginal product of labor. As the stock of capital rises, 
labor is displaced. Given output, less labor input causes its marginal productivity to be 
higher than its rate of return, i.e. real wages. This wedge can persist if the transition 
cost along the growth path is high. (4) Firms set the wage rate by the marginal product 
of the marginal worker rather than the marginal product of the average worker, due to 
heterogeneity. Maré and Hyslop, (2006, 2008) provide evidence that less skilled labor 
is hired at the up-turn of the New Zealand business cycle. If this were the case, then 
wages will have to be lower than the marginal product of the average worker. (5) Risk 
premiums create a wedge between the marginal product of labor and the real wage. (6) 
When social returns are not equal to private returns, actual returns must be corrected 
for taxes when possible. (7) Endogenous growth models assume an increasing return 
to scale rather (i.e., less than doubling factor inputs is needed to double output), which 
means that capital and labor will more than exhaust total output. 
 
The covariance between the wedge (real wages minus the marginal product of labor) 
and the unemployment rate over the business cycle is positive. Unemployment 
increases when the wedge is > 0 because the firm lays-off workers. 
 
Computing the wedge requires an estimate of the marginal product of labor. We 
assume a simple representative agent, where production is given by the Cobb – 
Douglas production function. The first-order condition would equation the marginal 
product of labor to the real wage.  
 
 Let the production function be a constant return to scale Cobb – Douglas: 
 
 LAKY  1 ,          (5) 
 
Where Y is real GDP, K is the stock of capital and L is labor, which is measured 
either in hours-worked or working age population. The parameter  is the share of 
labor. 
 
The marginal product of labor is: 
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 ,/11 hYLAKmpl
h
Y
  

         (6) 
 
 
which we can calibrate given K , L , and  .  
 
The stock of capital is measured using data on fixed capital formation, and an 
assumed value of the initial stock of capital and the depreciation rate. We assume that 
the stock of capital in the U.S. is approximately three times as big as GDP (e.g., 
Obstfeld and Rogoff, 1996) and the depreciation rate is somewhere between 5 and 8 
percent annually. For labor, we use the working age population (15-64). 
 
There are issues about measuring the share of labor, Krueger (1999). Karabarbunis 
(2014) provides four measures, and reports the correlation coefficients. First is BEA 
unadjusted, which is total compensation to employee / national income.
iii
 Second is 
BEA adjusted, where he treats compensations to employee as unambiguous labor 
income, proprietor’s income and net taxes on production and imports as ambiguous 
income, and all other categories such as rental income, corporate profits, and business 
transfers as unambiguous capital income. Third is BLS corporate, which does not 
require imputations of the labor earnings of sole proprietors, he uses labor share for 
the corporate sector. It is the ratio of corporate compensations to employee / gross 
value added of the corporate sector.
iv
 Fourth is BEA corporate, which is the share in 
the non-financial sector. These measures are highly, statistically significantly, 
correlated. Table (3) reports the correlation matrix. Figure (5) plots our estimates of 
the share of labor as in BEA above, which turns out to be sufficient for our purpose. It 
has been declining over time. To calibrate the marginal product of labor we use our 
estimates of the stock of capital, working age population and the share of labor.  
 
Gali (2005) argued that the time series properties of hours worked and employment or 
working age population can give rise to differences in measurements. To check the 
robustness of our estimate we calibrate the marginal product of labor using hours 
worked and working age population separately. Figure (6) plots both estimates. 
 
We report the correlations between various measures of the wedge in table (4). They 
differ in the way the real wage is computed. Figure (7) plots the four measures. Figure 
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(8) plot the different measures of the wedge with unemployment. The correlation is 
significant and positive as predicted by the theory. 
 
We summarize the effects of the wage gap and the wedge on unemployment using an 
unrestricted VAR.  
 
,2211 tptpttt XXXcX        (7) 
 
where, X is an )1( n  vector containing three variables, which are the HP-filtered 
measures of the wage gap, the wedge and unemployment. The wage gap is our 
measure of the difference the real wage and the reservation wage. The real wage 
is ePWw / . We use the Kalman filter’s measure of the reservation wage (see figure 
4). The wedge is the real wage minus the marginal product of labor, which we 
presented earlier. The error term is also a vector t , which is distributed i.i.d. ),0( N  
 
Figure (9) plots the VAR’s generalized impulse response functions of unemployment 
to the innovations of the wage gap and to the wedge. Ordering of the variables in the 
VAR is no longer a problem since the generalized impulse response function since 
Pesaran and Shin (1998) describe the impulse response function, where they construct 
an orthogonal set of innovations that does not depend on the VAR ordering. We use a 
Monte-Carlo with 10000 iterations to estimate the standard errors. The wage gap 
shock decreases unemployment and the wedge shock increases unemployment over 
the business cycle. Variance decomposition shows the growing importance of the 
wage gap and the wedge between the real wage and the marginal product of labor on 
unemployment. From period 6 to 12, they explain more than 50 percent of the 
variance of unemployment.     
 
Earlier we showed that the wage gap explains about 30 – 50 percent of the 
fluctuations in unemployment over the business cycle. Table (5) reports some 
regression results to show that the wedge and the change in the wedge can explain an 
additional 40 percent of the fluctuations in unemployment. The two variables, the 
wage gap and the wedge, explain nearly 80 percent of unemployment.  Most of the 
remaining unexplained variation is the dynamic, which is attributed to smoothing the 
data by the HP filter (Razzak, 1997)  
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4. Conclusion 
 
The empirical record of modern unemployment theories and models such as the 
efficiency wage theory, e.g., Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) Shirking model and the 
dynamic search and matching of Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) is weak. Dynamic 
search and matching models of unemployment predict that the volatility of the 
employment – vacancy ratio and average labor productivity are the same while the 
U.S. data show that the standard deviation of the unemployment-vacancy ratio is 20 
times larger than that of average labor productivity, Shimer (2005).  
 
Unemployment theories and models account for the wage gap, which is the difference 
between the real wage and the reservation wage only. In this setup, the increase in 
unemployment reduces real wages given reservation wages and productivity. The 
wage gap between the real wage and the reservation wage is best interpreted as the 
decision the worker’s make when faced with a wage offer. The worker accepts the job 
offer with a certain real wage when the real wage exceeds his or her reservation wage, 
given productivity. There is, however, another microeconomic-level decision not 
accounted for by most models of unemployment. It is the firm’s decision to hire labor. 
Over the business cycle, firms hire workers as long as the real wage is lower than the 
marginal productivity of labor; they stop hiring workers when the real wage is equal 
to the marginal productivity of labor; and they lay off workers when the real wage 
exceeds the marginal productivity of labor.  
 
By modeling both microeconomic decisions, the macroeconomic data are consistent 
with the micro decisions above. We use quarterly data from 1999 to 2013 for the U.S. 
to measure the real wage, the reservation wage, and the wedge between real wage and 
the marginal product of labor and show that these shocks have impulse response 
functions as predicted by the microeconomic theory and their variances explain more 
than 50 percent of the variation of unemployment. We also show that while the wage 
gap explains up to 50 percent of the unemployment dynamic, the wedge between the 
real wage and the marginal product of labor can explain an additional 30 percent of 
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unemployment dynamics. The remaining unexplained dynamic of unemployment is a 
statistical artifact related to the use of smoothing.   
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Table 1: Reservation Wage Correlations (HP-filtered) 
 
Rw1  
Rw2  
Rw3  
Rw4  
Rw5  
Rw6  
Rw7  
Rw8  
Rw9  
Rw10  
Kalman 
reservation 
wage  
Rw1   1.000000            
Rw2   0.650233  1.000000           
Rw3   0.460663  0.973860  1.000000          
Rw4   0.382314  0.950613  0.996266  1.000000         
Rw5   0.315967  0.926062  0.987421  0.997245  1.000000        
Rw6   0.269057  0.906512  0.978607  0.992632  0.998792  1.000000       
Rw7   0.450089  0.970710  0.999482  0.996755  0.989409  0.981082  1.000000      
Rw8   0.376595  0.948400  0.995391  0.999645  0.997904  0.993519  0.996729  1.000000     
Rw9   0.566496  0.994425  0.992383  0.978042  0.960621  0.945926  0.990434  0.976435  1.000000    
Rw10   0.371603  0.946690  0.994886  0.999605  0.998238  0.994117  0.996278  0.999985  0.975274  1.000000   
    Kalman  0.232124  0.862254  0.937944  0.953891  0.962094  0.964621  0.941003  0.955216  0.903047  0.955942  1.000000   
Reservation 
Wage  0.456463  0.955083  0.979319  0.975144  0.966935  0.957911  0.979904  0.975256  0.972599  0.974719  0.959104  1.000000 
 
RR ww 61   are calibrated reservation wages using equation (2) imposing the homogeneity restriction, where a is 2.65, the mean of log real wages as defined log )/(
ePW , 
W is the average hourly wage, and eP is 6-quarter moving average of CPI; and  is 0.50, 0.75, 0.85, 0.90, 0.95 and 0.99 for WR1 to WR6. For WR7-WR10 are calibrated 
reservation wages using equation (2) without imposing the homogeneity restrictions.
Rw7 90.01  and 15.02  ;
Rw8 95.01  and 10.02  ; 
Rw9 95.01  and 
25.02  and
Rw10 99.01  and 10.02   
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Table 2 
Dependent variable )1/ln(~ UUu   (i) 
(1999Q2 – 2013Q3) 
 Coefficient Estimates (P values) 
5gapwage (ii) -0.36 
(0.0000) 
- - - 
6gapwage  (ii) - -0.41 
(0.0000) 
- - 
8gapwage (iii) - - -0.26 
(0.0001) 
- 
)(Kalmangapwage (iv) - - - -0.16 
(0.0001) 
2R  0.34 0.53 0.15 0.25 
  0.0012 0.0010 0.0014 0.0013 
 
(i) u~ is the HP filtered series of )1/ln( UU  , whereU is the unemployment rate.  
(ii) Wage gaps are HP filtered Rww lnln  , where w is real wages and Rw is the reservation wage. The 
real wage is average hourly wage deflated by a 6-quarter moving average CPI. In wage gaps 5 and 
6,
Rw is calibrated using ywaw t
R ln)1(lnln 1    , where a is the mean log real wage equal 
to 2.65, y is productivity measured as GDP/working age population ratio, and  is 0.95 and 0.99 
respectively.  
(iii) In wage gap 8, Rw is calibrated using ywaw t
R lnlnln 211    , where 95.01   and 10.02   
so that the homogeneity restriction is not imposed.  
(iv) The wage gap based on the Kalman filter’s estimates of the reservation wage. 
(v) P values are in parentheses.  
(vi) Standard errors and covariance matrix are estimated by the Newey-West method with Bartlett 
Kernel bandwidth = 4).  
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Table 3 
The Correlation Matrix of Measures of the Labor Shares 
(HP filtered) 
 BEA unadjusted  BEA adjusted  BLS corporate BEA corporate 
BEA unadjusted  1.00    
BEA adjusted  0.96 1.00   
BLS corporate 0.85 0.86 1.00  
BEA corporate 0.86 0.87 0.95 1.00 
Source (Karabarbunis , 2014) 
 
 
 
Table 4 
The Correlation Matrix of Measures of the Wedge 
(HP filtered) 
 Wedge 1 Wedge 2 Wedge 3 Wedge 4 
Wedge 1 1.00    
Wedge 2 0.98 1.00   
Wedge 3 0.97 0.98 1.00  
Wedge 4 0.98 0.97 0.96 1.00 
Wedge is the real wage minus the marginal product of labor.  
The marginal product of labor is 160.04.06.0 LK   , where L  is working age population. 
Wedge1, 2, 3, and 4 differ in how the real wage is measured only.  
Wedge 1:real wage is the nominal wage adjusted for expected inflation measure as a 6-quarter moving 
average of annual CPI inflation. 
 Wedge 2: real wage is the nominal wage adjusted for expected inflation measured by the Philadelphia 
fed survey measure.  
Wedge3: real wage is the nominal wage adjusted for expected inflation measured by the University of 
Michigan survey measure.  
Wedge4: real wage is the nominal wage deflated by a 6-quarter moving average of the CPI level. 
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Table 5 
Regressions: Dependent variable )1/ln(~ UUu  (i) 
 
 Coefficients 
Wage gap 5 (ii) -02.0 
(0.0007) 
-- -- -- 
Wage gap 6 (ii) -- -0.24 
(0.0000) 
-- -- 
Wage gap 8 (iii) -- -- -0.15 
(0.0118) 
-- 
Wage gap (Kalman) (iv) -- -- -- -0.18 
(0.0043) 
Wedge (v)  0.20 
(0.0005) 
 0.17 
(0.0009) 
 0.23 
(0.0001) 
 0.23 
(0.0001) 
Wedge  0.51 
(0.0000) 
 
 0.43 
(0.0000) 
 0.55 
(0.0000) 
 0.53 
(0.0000) 
2R  0.73 0.78 0.69 0.70 
  0.0008 0.0007 0.0008 0.0008 
  
(i) u~ is the HP filtered series of )1/ln( UU  , whereU is the unemployment rate.  
(ii) Wage gaps are HP filtered Rww lnln  , where w is real wages and Rw is the reservation 
wage. The real wage is average hourly wage deflated by a 6-quarter moving average CPI. 
In wage gaps 5 and 6,
Rw is calibrated using ywaw t
R ln)1(lnln 1    , where a is 
the mean log real wage equal to 2.65, y is the natural log of productivity measured as 
GDP/working age population ratio, and  is 0.95 and 0.99 respectively.  
(iii) In wage gap 8, Rw is calibrated using ywaw t
R lnlnln 211    , where 95.01   and 
10.02   so that the homogeneity restriction is not imposed.  
(iv) The wage gap based on the Kalman filter’s estimate of the reservation wage. 
(v) Wedge: real wage is the nominal wage deflated by a 6-quarter moving average of the 
CPI level. 
(vi) Both, the dependent variable and the independent variable in the equation above are 
deviations from the HP filter. 
(vii) P values are in parentheses.  
(viii) Standard errors and covariance matrix are estimated by the Newey-West method with 
Bartlett Kernel bandwidth = 4).  
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 Figure 1 
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31 ww  are average hourly wage adjusted for expected inflation measures as 
6-quarter moving average of CPI inflation, the Philadelphia fed’s survey of inflation expectations 
and the Michigan University’s survey of inflation expectations respectively. 4w is log )/(
ePW , 
W is the average hourly wage, and eP is 6-quarter moving average of CPI. 
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Figure 2 
 
RR ww 61  are calibrated reservation wages using equation (2) imposing the homogeneity 
restriction, where a is 2.65, the mean of log real wages as defined log )/( ePW , W is the average 
hourly wage, and eP is 6-quarter moving average of CPI; and  is 0.50, 0.75, 0.85, 0.90, 0.95 and 
0.99 for r
RR ww 61  respectively .
RR ww 107  are calibrated reservation wages using equation (2) 
without imposing the homogeneity restrictions. 
Rw7 90.01  and 15.02  ; 
Rw8 95.01  and 
10.02  ;
Rw9 95.01  and 25.02  ; and
Rw10 99.01  and 10.02   
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Figure 3 
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Figure 4 
The 295.0 test of the correlation between the wage gap and unemployment (HP filtered) 
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The wage gap is the HP-filtered
Rww , where w is log real wages and Rw is the log reservation wage. 
The real wage is average hourly wage deflated by a 6-quarter moving average CPI. The reservation wage  
is estimated either by calibrating the log equation ywaw t
R ln)1(lnln 1    , where y is log 
productivity, which is real GDP to working age population ratio (plots 1 - 6); or by calibrating 
ywaw t
R lnlnln 211    , where the homogeneity restriction is not imposed (plots 7-10); or by 
estimating ttt
R
tt uyww  
~ln)1(lnln using the Kalman filter and Maximum Likelihood 
method. And, u~ is the HP-filtered )1/ln( UU  , whereU is the unemployment rate.  
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Figure 5 
The Share of Labor 
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Figure 6 
Marginal Product of Labor 
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Figure 7 
Measures of the Wedge 
 
 
Figure 8 
Measures of the Wedge and Unemployment 
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Figure 9 
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Variance Decomposition 
  
Period S.E. Wedge Wage Gap Unemployment  
          
 1  0.038496  26.63352  3.068642  70.29784 
 2  0.062935  28.48215  7.212507  64.30534 
 3  0.081093  28.60753  12.32417  59.06830 
 4  0.094627  27.40724  17.97096  54.62180 
 5  0.104680  25.40900  23.69166  50.89935 
 6  0.112047  23.18024  29.05839  47.76137 
 7  0.117355  21.23961  33.67698  45.08341 
 8  0.121166  19.99733  37.20395  42.79872 
 9  0.124018  19.70109  39.39692  40.90199 
 10  0.126402  20.38655  40.18942  39.42404 
 11  0.128717  21.85973  39.75057  38.38969 
 12  0.131227  23.74622  38.47569  37.77809 
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Data Appendix 
 
Variable Description and sources 
U  Seasonally adjusted civilian unemployment rate. Source: US Department of Labor.  
Y  Seasonally adjusted real chain GDP. Source: Department of Commerce, Bureau of 
Economic Analysis. 
P  Seasonally adjusted CPI for all urban consumers, all items. Source: U.S. Department of 
Labor Statistics. 
W  Seasonally adjusted average hourly earnings of production and nonsupervisory Employees: 
Total Private. Source: U.S. Department of Labor: Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
e  (1) Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia Survey of inflation expectations. (2) The 
University of Michigan Survey of inflation expectations. 
L  Seasonally adjusted Working Age Population: Aged 15-64: All Persons for the United 
States. Source: OECD; and, average weekly hours. It is the employment rate*total annual 
hours worked / 52. Source: OECD. 
Fixed 
capital 
formation 
Gross Domestic Product by Expenditure in Constant Prices: Gross Fixed Capital 
Formation for the United States. Source: OECD. 
WAP Seasonally adjusted working age population: Aged 15-64: All Persons for the United 
States. Source: OECD 
 
                                                 
i
 It does not really matter whether we measured the unemployment in log form or not. It is just more 
convenient for interpreting the coefficients. In a log form we can interpret regression coefficients as 
elasticity. For example, see Barro (1977). 
 
ii
 The HP filter , the Band Pass filter (Baxter-King, 1997) or the Christiano-Fitzgerald (2005) produce 
similar cyclical results, albeit the BP filter produces smoother cycles than the HP filter. 
iii
 The data are line 1 and 2 of NIPA, table 1.12. 
iv
 The data are in line 4 of NIPA, Table 1.14. 
 
